Do these conditionals always necessitate a potentially reversible contingency? I.e. if A, then B (also implies) if NOT A, then NOT B?
I am wrestling with this idea in 1 Jn 1:9 for the following reasons:
1. The text appears to be throwing the weight of John's statement on the faithfulness and ability of Christ (πιστός ἐστιν καὶ δίκαιος) to forgive and cleanse when we confess, rather than the outcome of not confessing. With ἵνα ἀφῇ ἡμῖν τὰς ἁμαρτίας following πιστός ἐστιν καὶ δίκαιος, it looks like the qualification for cleansing is in Christ's faithfulness and righteousness, rather than the preceding subjunctive condition of what we do (or don't do).
2. It doesn't seem logical to me that the opposite of a conditional must always be inferred in a given language. For example, if I make the following conditional statement, "If you come to my house at 2:30, I'll be there," it does not necessarily follow that if you don't come at 2:30, I wont be there. I may be there anyway, even if you don't come. It seems possible this is the case with 1 John 1:9. Of course, I want the authority of the text to speak rather than my own reasoning here, I'm only trying to illustrate.
3. To insist on a reversible contingency (if that is what it is called), wouldn't it also in this particular case hinge Christ's being "faithful and just" on the preceding subjunctive conditional (ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν πιστός ἐστιν καὶ δίκαιος)?
I understand "faithful and just" to be John's emphasis and that we need never wonder if forgiveness can be received when confessing, precisely because Christ is "faithful and just." Please correct me if I am wrong and I welcome any explanations you all are willing to offer.
Thanks in advance!
Edited by Mark Nigro , 18 October 2012 - 01:54 AM.